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The ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Addressing Family Inequality Through Functional Regulation
Linda C. McClain* & Douglas NeJaime±
(draft chapter written for THE ALI AT 100: ESSAYS ON ITS CENTENNIAL
(co-edited by Andrew S. Gold and Robert W. Gordon, forthcoming 2023)
INTRODUCTION
As part of the commemoration of the American Law Institute’s Centennial, this Essay reflects
on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (“Principles”), a project completed in 2000.1 Upon
approval, President Charles Alan Wright expressed an expectation that the Principles “will be
extremely influential in American law and a product of which this Institute can be very proud.”2 In
the last two decades, with only a small number of exceptions, state lawmakers have not enacted, and
courts have not expressly adopted, the Principles’ recommendations.3 Accordingly, some scholars
have dismissed the Principles as a failed project.4 In this Essay, we offer a different perspective,
viewing the Principles not as a command to lawmakers and judges but instead as an important
authority that, operating in dialogue with courts, legislatures, advocates, and scholars, has shaped and
advanced a progressive agenda in family law.5
Our account reflects the roots of the project. Because family law at the time was “less
settled”—indeed, “in flux”6—it was a prime candidate for the greater “flexibility” afforded by a
*

Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Anne Urowsky Professor of Law, Yale Law School. We owe a special debt to Kate Bartlett, Grace Blumberg, and
Ira Ellman for speaking with us about their work on the Principles and for reacting to an earlier draft of this Essay. For
helpful comments, we also thank Susan Appleton, Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bob Gordon, and Courtney Joslin, as well as
participants in the Third Annual Nonmarriage Roundtable at Washington University School of Law and in a Boston
University School of Law Faculty Workshop. For excellent research assistance, we thank Grace Choi, Sam Davis, Madison
Harris-Parks, and Brittany Swift. We are grateful to Sara Oswald at the Biddle Law Library at the University of
Pennsylvania Carey School of Law for her archival work.
1 See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2002) (hereinafter
“Principles”). The Principles were adopted on May 16, 2000, at the ALI annual meeting in Washington, D.C. In addition
to Wright’s leadership, ALI Director Geoffrey Hazard initiated and led the Principles project until 1999, when Lance
Leibman became Director. Id. at xv.
2 Tuesday Morning Session – May 16, 2000, A.L.I. Proc. 106, 144 (2000).
3 See Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight
Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573 (2008); Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child
Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 301, 301 (2001) (“Chapter Two holds the distinction of being the only portion to have been adopted by a state
legislature.”). For a critique of the analysis done by Clisham and Wilson, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking
in Child-Custody Decisionmaking, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2014).
4 See, e.g., Clisham & Wilson, supra note 3, at 576 (“[T]he Principles have not had the influence the ALI hoped for with
legislators or courts—the two groups at which they are principally directed.”); David Westfall, Unprincipled Family
Dissolution: The American Law Institute’s Recommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
917, 960 (2004) (“The Principles are a failed effort at family law reform and may not even enjoy the support of most of the
members of the ALI.”).
5 See Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 324 (2020). Cf. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (2004) (explaining how legal scholars influence family law in direct and indirect
ways).
6 See Principles, supra note 1, at xv (“Director’s Foreword” by Lance Liebman).
±
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“Principles” project than a “Restatement.”7 When first introducing the family dissolution project to
the ALI membership, President Wright observed that the Principles “did not purport to be a
Restatement” but instead “purports to state what the Institute believes are the principles that
enlightened jurisdictions should follow,” for example, by adopting legislation.8 As esteemed ALI
Council member Bennett Boskey later explained the virtues of principles projects: “by concentrating
on the cutting edge of the law the Institute can contribute recommendations for sound and useful
development in what is often a fast-paced arena.”9 Consistent with this aim, Katharine Bartlett, a
reporter on the family dissolution Principles, explained the drafters’ effort “to find ‘best practices’
without necessarily being constrained by existing law.”10 In this Essay, we show how the Principles’
drafters, themselves influential scholars who had been developing their own approaches to legal
regulation of the family, intervened in cutting-edge issues in ways that staked out and elaborated a
progressive family law agenda that would continue to gain traction in the decades after the Principles’
publication.
For the drafters, a progressive agenda must insist that family law reflect the ways that
individuals form and live out relationships, rather than marshal the power of law to impose a narrow
vision of the family and leave unprotected those who fail to conform. The need to meet families where
they are yielded a legal framework that vindicates critical equality commitments and adopts a
functional, rather than formal, approach to legal regulation. A functional approach accommodates the
family relationships that individuals form, values the work of care that individuals contribute to their
families, and recognizes that relationships give rise to rights and responsibilities. We link the
Principles’ preoccupation with family inequality to its functional approach to recognition and regulation.
Relations within families—particularly gender-differentiated roles in different-sex couples—as well as
distinctions between families—particularly marital-status distinctions that also implicated sexual
orientation discrimination—concerned the ALI’s drafters.11 Rather than distinguish family relations
based on gender, sexual orientation, or marital status, the drafters articulated generally applicable
principles that sought to mitigate inequalities by reflecting, and accommodating, families’ lived
experiences. Drawing on archival materials, interviews, and other relevant primary and secondary
sources, this Essay demonstrates how concerns with inequality shaped the Principles’ functional
approach to both adult and parent-child relationships.
With respect to adult relationships, we attend to questions of gender equality within marital
and nonmarital families. The reporters recognized the decline of rigid gender roles in family law and
in society. However, in light of the persistent gendered realities of family life, they worried about the
See Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 255, 261 (Spr. 2009).
Tuesday Afternoon Session – May 16, 1995, 72 A.L.I. Proc. 45, 73 (1995). As explained elsewhere in this volume,
the ALI has since “formalized” this distinction, explaining “Principles are primarily addressed to legislatures, administrative
agencies, or private actors,” but “may be addressed to courts when an area is so new that there is little established law.”
They may also “suggest best practices for these institutions.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 4, 13 (2015) (revised style manual). See Kenneth S. Abraham and G. Edward White, The Work
of the American Law Institute in Historical Context, this volume.
9 Boskey, supra note 6, at 261.
10 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 5, 6 (2002) (noting that “Principles” strive to find “best practices” rather than “restate” the prevailing law and
also recognizing role of empirical and normative questions in crafting custody rules).
11 On these two dimensions of equality, see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 5-7, 117-219 (2006). On the relationship between equality principles and the functional
turn in family law, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s Equality Project for Our Empirical Age, in
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 237-56 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel Cere, ed.
2013); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 334-40.
7
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harms that purportedly neutral legal rules inflicted on women. This equality-inflected approach led the
drafters to be skeptical of contract models that were premised on equal bargaining power of spouses
or nonmarital partners and ignored that relationships themselves gave rise to duties. Accordingly, the
drafters sought to reward non-monetary investments in family relationships and to provide financially
for spouses and partners (disproportionately, women) who sacrificed economic opportunities in the
interest of the family unit. This perspective is reflected in the Principles’ approach to alimony
(“compensatory spousal payments”) and property distribution for divorcing couples, as well as in its
application of that approach to unmarried “domestic partners.”
The treatment of unmarried couples also reflected the drafters’ concerns with inequality based
on marital status and sexual orientation. When the project began, no state permitted same-sex couples
to marry and, although various municipalities had domestic partnerships laws, no state did. By the
time the Reporters finished, the federal government and many states had “defense of marriage laws”
limiting marriage to one man and one woman and even, in some instances, prohibiting alternative
formal statuses. Vermont had enacted a civil union regime for same-sex couples, and California had
adopted, and begun to expand, a domestic partnership law. Against that backdrop, the Principles
proposed to treat as “domestic partners” two persons—whatever their gender—who shared life as a
couple, and to bring them under the protective umbrella of marriage law for purposes of property
distribution and alimony. In the ALI’s perspective, same-sex couples whose relationships “closely
resemble marriages in function”12 should not be forced to live outside of family dissolution rules.
Similar equality concerns animated the Principles’ approach to parenthood. The drafters
sought to protect parent-child relationships formed outside of marital families, which necessarily
included families formed by same-sex couples. Unlike the paradigmatic different-sex couple, same-sex
couples with children necessarily include a nongenetic parent. Accordingly, commitments to equality
based on marital status and sexual orientation, as well as concerns with children’s welfare, led the
drafters to elaborate an increasingly capacious functional approach to parental recognition. The law,
on this view, should follow actual parent-child relationships. To implement this approach, the
Principles adopted two pathbreaking concepts—de facto parent and parent by estoppel.
Even as we identify the Principles’ role in tackling critical issues that have preoccupied family
law in the years since, we also recognize the limits of the ALI’s approach. The Principles addressed
inequality only partially and stopped short of fully elaborating a functional approach to family
recognition. Of course, as a project with law reform ambitions, the drafters were constrained by
political and practical considerations that led them to accept key dimensions of the “traditional”
family. Indeed, they explicitly disavowed any intention to encourage nonmarriage over marriage and,
to the contrary, predicted that the Principles would reduce the “incentive to avoid marriage” to escape
responsibilities to a partner.13 Yet, combatants in the culture wars urged opposition to the Principles
for weakening or “de-privileging” marriage by assimilating nonmarital relationships to the model of
marriage.14 Similarly, the functional approach to parental recognition did not reach its logical
conclusion of parity between biological and nonbiological parent-child relationships. Yet, critics
assailed the functional categories that included LGBTQ parents and other nonbiological parents for
“fragmenting parenthood” by eliminating biology as its basis.15

Principles, supra note 1, at 915 (emphasis added).
Id. at 916.
14 See, e.g., Institute for American Values et al., The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles 22 (2000); Institute for
American Values et al., The Future of Family Law 5, 16-18 (2005).
15 See, e.g., The Future of Family Law, supra note 14, at 16, 37.
12
13
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Nonetheless, in identifying and advancing a functional approach to family recognition in part
as a means to address persistent inequality in both law and society, the ALI supplied an emergent
family law agenda with credibility. Since the time the Principles were promulgated, the functional
approach, in important respects, has grown dramatically, justified in part on equality grounds. The
law of parental recognition has embraced functional criteria as part of a broader agenda to protect
children’s relationships with their primary caregivers and to vindicate commitments to equality based
on gender, sexual orientation, and marital status. While the ALI’s status-based approach to nonmarital
adult relationships remains less dominant than the contract model it criticized, its position nonetheless
serves as a vital reference point and model in ongoing debates over legal remedies for unmarried
partners. Given declining marriage rates and rising rates of nonmarital cohabitation, the need for such
legal remedies arguably persists even though marriage for same-sex couples eliminated a significant
source of inequality evident to the Principles’ drafters.16 In other areas, such as premarital and marital
agreements, the Principles’ insistence on tempering freedom of contract given the particular context
of intimate bargaining and how family relationships change over time has influenced significant law
reform projects.17
To be clear, we are not making a claim about the Principles’ influence on each of the areas it
tackled. We do not, and cannot in an essay of this length, address each major section of the Principles.
Rather, we focus on a few key doctrinal areas to show the purchase of the Principles’ conceptual
framework. The question is not whether courts and legislatures adopted the Principles’ proposals, but
instead whether the ALI—in keeping with the aims of a “principles” project—identified and
elaborated concepts that have become central to critical debates in family law and that, to varying
degrees, have influenced the direction of the law.18
I.

ADULT RELATIONSHIPS

An image from the tech world, path determination, seems apt to describe the impact that the
selection of Ira Ellman as (initially) Reporter and then Chief Reporter and Grace Blumberg as coreporter had on the chapters of the Principles on which they collaborated relating to adult-adult
relationships.19 Blumberg and Ellman shared a skepticism about contract as an adequate model for
adult relationships because it failed to recognize that relationships themselves could give rise to duties.
Instead, they favored a status-based approach in which law would acknowledge and address the
realities of family life, including inequalities between men and women (as spouse and cohabitants),
marital and nonmarital families, and different-sex and same-sex couples.

16 On the growing prevalence of and reasons for nonmarital cohabitation in the U.S., see Deirdre Bloome and Sharon
Ang, Marriage and Union Formation in the United States: Recent Trends Across Racial Groups and Economic Backgrounds, 57
DEMOGRAPHY 1753 (Sept. 10, 2020); Nikki Graft, Key Findings on Marriage and Cohabitation in the U.S., Pew Research Center
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/06/key-findings-on-marriage-and-cohabitation-in-theu-s/
17 See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood and Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.
Q. 313, 314-15, 329-30 (2012) (noting the Principles’ “sharp criticism” of the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act and
contrasting approach as among factors making “timing seem right” for promulgating the new Uniform Premarital and
Marital Agreements Act).
18 See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 324 (situating the ALI Principles in family law’s functional turn).
19 In his “Director’s Foreword” to the Principles, Lance Liebman observed that “finding the right Reporters proved
difficult,” but that after “valiant early contributions” by several professors, “the team of Ira Ellman, Chief Reporter, and
Kate Bartlett and Grace Blumberg, Reporters took over and led the work to its happy conclusion.” Principles, supra note
2, at xv.
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The Principles’ functional approach not only included both marital and nonmarital
relationships but also justified assimilating some unmarried couples to the law of marriage. This
ambitious and controversial approach emerged over time.20 At the 1995 ALI annual meeting, Ellman
stated that a “project on Family Dissolution . . . largely means divorce,” although there was a
“contemplated” chapter on “the dissolution of nonmarital relationships” and chapters on custody and
child support would address both marital and nonmarital children. In that sense, the project was “on
the dissolution of both formal and informal families.” However, Ellman introduced draft chapters on
property (Chapter 4) and compensatory payments (Chapter 5) as “really exclusively divorce topics.”21
The final version of the Principles, however, made most of Chapters 4 and 5 applicable to some
nonmarital couples on the rationale that relationships that met the criteria of “domestic partners”
(Chapter 6) “closely resemble marriages in function, and their termination therefore poses the same
social and legal issues as does the dissolution of a marriage.” Similarly, Chapter 7 (a late addition to
the Principles) specified rules for how both spouses and domestic partners could make agreements to alter
or confirm the “legal rights and obligations” they would otherwise have to each other under the
Principles or “other law governing marital dissolution.”22
In what follows, we focus on the drafters’ approach to spousal support and domestic partners,
showing how concerns with inequality based on gender, marital status, and sexual orientation shaped
a functional approach to intimate relationships. The Principles’ approach to spousal support aimed to
address the economic inequality arising in marriage due to the persistence of the gendered pattern of
a wife’s investment in homemaking and caretaking and a husband’s investment in market labor. The
Principles reflected and extended Ellman’s scholarly approach, seeking to compensate spouses for
economic losses arising from sharing behavior in marriage.23 The Principles’ status-based approach to
unmarried cohabitants aimed to address gendered patterns of care and work in nonmarital families.
The Principles adapted Blumberg’s influential proposal to “assimilate cohabitants to married persons”
for purposes of property division and spousal support.24
A. Spousal Support
1. Ellman’s Call to Focus on (Gendered) “Economic and Social Realities”
In an influential 1989 article, The Theory of Alimony, Ellman contended that neither contract nor
partnership concepts provided an adequate model for marriage—or theory for alimony awards.
Ellman noted the stark disconnect between modern alimony law’s formal gender neutrality and the
“economic and social realities that usually make the wife economically dependent rather than the
husband.” Those “realities” included the greater “domestic burden” that wives bore from shouldering
primary responsibility for “domestic needs”—particularly childcare—even as the majority of wives
worked outside the home. Contract would not remedy a wife’s loss from such marital investment if
the marriage ended in divorce.25
Ellman’s article painted a vividly gendered picture of why marriage—without an “enforceable
long-term contract”—is a “risky investment.” The “traditional wife” invests in a marriage early by
having and raising children and providing her husband “with the supportive domestic environment
20 For examples of critiques, see RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed. 2006).
21 Tuesday Afternoon Session – May 16, 1995, 72 A.L.I. Proc. 45, 66 (1995).
22 Principles, supra note 1, at 915, 945-46.
23 Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1989).
24 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA REV. 1125, 1166 (1981).
25 Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, supra note 23, at 4 & n.2, 13, 40.
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that furthered his market success,” with the expectation of later “sharing in the fruits of her husband’s
eventual market success.” A wife may give her husband “‘the best years of her life’” without a return
on her investment, while the husband exits the marriage able to take “much of the gain realized” (such
as increased earning capacity) into a new marriage. While such “marital ‘specialization’” “makes sense
for most couples” if “they view their marriage as a “sharing enterprise,” a “disproportionate loss” is
suffered by the spouse who specialized in domestic labor if the commitment to share breaks down.26
Ellman did not argue that family law should discourage gendered role specialization and
sharing behavior or steer people toward more egalitarian marriages. Rather, given how spouses actually
conduct their lives, alimony law should reward, rather than punish, sharing behavior and sacrifices.
Ellman proposed to reconceptualize alimony as one spouse’s obligation to compensate the other for
“residual” loss (i.e., surviving the marriage) in the latter’s earning capacity arising from engaging in
domestic labor during marriage. He proposed several principles for redefining alimony as
“compensable marital investment.”27
2. Chapter 5: Status (and the Passage of Time) Give Rise to Duties
Chapter 5 incorporates Ellman’s critique of contract and partnership models and his proposed
theoretical framing around compensation for financial losses. Its objective is “to allocate financial
losses that arise at the dissolution of a marriage according to equitable principles that are consistent
and predictable in application.” This shift from spousal need to compensation for losses “arising from
the marriage and its failure” transforms a spouse’s petition “from a plea for help to a claim of
entitlement.”28
The commentary emphasizes status and the duration of a relationship as giving rise to duties
that survive a marriage’s end: “as marriages lengthen, continuing obligations between former spouses
depend less on explicit agreement and promise than on their relationship itself, molded by them
jointly, with consequences for them and their children.” How spouses conduct their joint lives grounds
such duties. Section 5.03 specifies different awards based on several categories of compensable loss,
approximating “the fact patterns that typically support alimony claims in existing law.” One category
mirrors Ellman’s article in focusing on earning-capacity loss incurred during marriage and continuing
after dissolution due to “one spouse’s disproportionate share, during marriage, of the care of the
marital children . . . .” Chapter 5 goes further, recognizing loss arising from other forms of caretaking
when one or both spouses have a moral obligation to engage in it.29
Chapter 5 also went beyond The Theory of Alimony by recognizing compensable loss in a
marriage of “significant duration” without inquiring into sharing behavior. Section 5.03(2)(a) deems a
“compensable loss” the “loss of living standard experienced at dissolution by the spouse who has less
wealth or earning capacity.” Time itself is a proxy for changes—and their impact—in a marital
relationship. Thus, equitable principles require accounting for “losses that arise from the changes in
life opportunities and expectations caused by the adjustments individuals ordinarily make over the
course of a long marital relationship.”30
The significance of the passage of time in entwining lives and engendering obligations is also
evident in Chapter 4 (on dividing property). Section 4.12 provides that, in sufficiently long-term
Id. at 42-44, 48.
Id. at 49, 53-73. Ellman argued that any loss in an “egalitarian marriage” would fall on both spouses, but they might
still be in unequal positions after divorce since husbands usually have greater earnings than wives. Id. at 45-46.
28 Principles, supra note 1, at 787, 790.
29 Id. at 793, 798 (§ 5.03(2)(b)), 801.
30 Id. at 787, 798 (§§ 5.02(2)(a), (3)(b)).
26
27
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marriages, a portion of each spouse’s separate property should be (gradually) recharacterized at
dissolution as marital property, with the percentage increasing with the length of the marriage. In
support, the reporters appealed to how spouses think about their property as a marriage lengthens and
drew a parallel to Chapter 5’s increase in the amount of compensatory payments based on a marriage’s
length.31
In defending the controversial recharacterization provision at an ALI meeting, Ellman
appealed to the interplay of ownership and equity, arguing that equity becomes more important in a
long marriage: “people should not leave a marriage of 25 or 30 years’ standing with significant
differences in financial status.” Dean Herma Hill Kay supported the provision as a “brilliant stroke”
that “corresponds” to the expectations of “most people” in long marriages who “feel that the sharp
distinctions that the law imposes on separate and community property really are not very meaningful
in their lives.”32
3. Gender Dynamics and Feminist Criticisms of Chapter 5
Chapter 5’s illustrations—intended to represent typical cases—reveal the gender dynamics not
evident from the gender-neutral language of its principles. The reasoning behind using feminine
pronouns (“she”/“her”) for the “long-time homemaker” was that “in understanding the nature of
the obligation that arises in the long-term marriage, it is useful to think first about the traditional
homemaker wife, as perhaps the clearest case.” However, although the historical pattern of a wife’s
financial dependence on a husband is the most “persuasive application” of compensation for loss, it
also applies when husbands are “financially dependent upon their wives.” Further, because the
Principles make persons who qualify as “domestic partners” under Chapter 6 subject to most of
Chapters 4 and 5 (absent an express opt-out), Chapter 5’s principles would apply to same-sex partners
who were not (then) able to marry. Presumably, Chapter 5’s status-based reasoning—that obligations
arise as “the parties’ lives become entwined”—would equally apply to long-term cohabitation
(whatever the partners’ gender): “As a marriage lengthens, the parties assume roles and functions with
respect to one another. In sharing a life together, they mold one another.”33
Even as the Principles sought to address gender inequality, it did not go as far as some feminist
critics of alimony law urged. At one annual meeting, family law scholar Carol Bruch moved
(unsuccessfully) to resubmit—rather than approve—Chapter 5 “in light of [the] large body of
thoughtful scholarship” attempting to “right the wrongs of unequal living standards after divorce.”
The project, Bruch charged, had “basically ignored” the work of “all of the people who have been
writing over the last 10 years to say what horrible injustices have occurred to women under our spousal
support laws.”34 Bruch argued that, as a “Principles,” rather than a “Restatement,” the draft should be
an “an improvement” of the current law, not “an apology” or “rationale” for it.35 Another concern
was that Chapter 5 failed to address the residual and permanent income and earning capacity loss,

Id. at 769 (§ 4.12).
Wednesday Morning Session, May 17, 1995, 72 A.L.I. Proc. 91, 130, 140 (1995). By a vote of 95 to 101, a motion
to recommit Section 4.18 (what became Section 4.12) to the Reporters for reconsideration failed. Id. at 142.
33 Principles, supra note 1, at 809, 811.
34 Wednesday morning Session, May 15, 1996, 73 A.L.I. Proc. 109, 110, 117 (1996) (mentioning Professors Krauskopf,
Brinig, Czapanskiy, and herself). Bruch drew on her experience as “a housewife of seven years” to criticize the
“demeaning” tone of parts of the draft toward “women who have devoted their efforts to a joint enterprise” and to insist
on the aptness of an equal partnership model. Id. at 121 (1995).
35 Id. at 110.
31
32
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even following a “relatively short term marriage,” experienced by a caretaking spouse who becomes
(after divorce) the custodial spouse.36
B. Unmarried Cohabitants
1. Blumberg’s Argument for a Status-Based Approach to Cohabitation
In a generative 1981 article, Cohabitation without Marriage: A Different Perspective, Blumberg noted
the American “romance with freedom of contract” despite its obvious limits as applied to intimate
relationships. She contended that “publicly created status is a much more sustainable vehicle for
handling support and property claims of unmarried and married cohabitants than is contract theory.”
Contract theory produced “unjust results” given cohabitants’ unequal bargaining power. Further, this
dynamic was gendered: inequality in economic power between men and women produced unequal
bargaining power in marriage and cohabitation since “self-interest would lead the man to give up as
little [wealth] as possible.” Cohabitants often followed marriage-like gendered patterns: “pervasive
sexual segregation in the labor force, gender-based pay differentials, higher female unemployment
rates, and a tradition of male primacy” usually led couples to invest in “the male.” Challenging a view
of nonmarital cohabitation as “experimentation” freeing women “from their traditional roles,”
Blumberg contended that sociological studies and case law revealed that “the woman wanted to marry
and was economically powerless,” while the man was “domineering and economically powerful;” the
cohabitation relationship itself was “long and traditional in terms of sex stereotyped role
assumption.”37
All these factors demonstrated the inadequacy of a contract model focused on the “intent of
the parties” with respect to their nonmarital cohabitation. Cohabiting women engaged in “marriagelike” traditional roles, yet lacked the remedies available to wives through doctrines like equitable
distribution and rehabilitative alimony. Blumberg proposed a “simple solution”: “assimilate
cohabitants to married persons for purposes of maintenance, property division, and elective share
statutes.” Instead of Marvin v. Marvin’s model of looking to express or implied contract or to equitable
remedies, directly imposing “divorce remedies” would be fairer than “pretending concern for
cohabitants’ ‘intent,’” given that most cohabitants do not make express agreements.38
Blumberg’s status model, treating “a cohabitation of two or more years’ duration or a
cohabitation of any duration in which there is a child born to the parties . . . as though it were a lawful
marriage,” foreshadowed the approach of Chapter 6. Blumberg countered arguments that treating
cohabitants “as though they were married” was unfair with sociological studies showing that
cohabitants think that “there is no difference between marriage and cohabitation” and that “they will
be and ought to be treated as though they were married persons”—although post-separation, men,
particularly, tended to reevaluate “marriage-like cohabitation” as “non-marriage-like.” 39
2. Chapter 6’s Status-based Model and Inclusion of Same-sex Couples
By the late 1990s, when Blumberg and Ellman drafted Chapter 6, they could look to statusbased models in the U.S.—most prominently Washington State’s application of its community36 For discussion, see Tuesday Afternoon Session – May 14, 1996, 73 A.L.I. Proc. 53, 67-80. As another example of
this gap, Chapter 5 did not require “income equalization at the dissolution of long marriages.” See Principles, supra note 1,
at 825-831 (noting “considerable feminist literature” urging post-divorce income sharing, while arguing Chapter 5’s “less
ambitious principle” would still yield “larger awards than those currently granted in many alimony cases”).
37 Blumberg, Cohabitation without Marriage, supra note 24, at 1133, 1163, 1168.
38 Id. at 1166, 1168.
39 Id.
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property laws to stable, marriage-like relationships.40 Also by this time, recognition of the needs of
same-sex couples expanded the earlier focus on the gendered dynamics of “heterosexual
cohabitation.”41 For Blumberg and Ellman, any chapter on nonmarital cohabitants must include samesex couples.42 (At UCLA, Blumberg was involved in efforts to extend family benefits to employees’
same-sex partners.43) Chapter 6 observes: “there are domestic partners who are not allowed to marry
each other under state law because they are of the same sex, although they are otherwise eligible to
marry and would marry one another if the law allowed them to do so.”44 Thus, while the basis for
Chapter 6 was contract’s inadequacy for intimate adult relationships, one justification for it was samesex couples’ exclusion from marriage.45
Aptly, Chapter 6’s Illustrations featured same-sex and different-sex couples. Representative of
social realities and of fact patterns common in case law, many illustrations featuring different-sex
couples included gendered role specialization.46 Some examples featuring same-sex partners included
economic disparity and role specialization, while others featured more egalitarian arrangements.47
3. Assimilating Cohabitation to Marriage: A “unitary system”
When the Principles project commenced, it was not evident that it would take the status-based
approach to nonmarital cohabitation championed by Blumberg in 1981. The “Background Paper” for
the January 25-26, 1990 meeting, convened to “inform and shape the American Law Institute project
to draft Principles of Law Governing Family Dissolution,” lists “the dissolution of informal intimate
relationships” as among the major issues.48 Further, it notes a shift in public attitudes about such
relationships “to tolerance, if not approval,” and “increased openness and public tolerance of same
gender intimate relationships,” reflected in “a body of legislation and developing case law.”49 But the
“very preliminary draft” shared with participants states that, while the parts on child support and child
custody “shall apply to children of both formal and informal relationships,” the parts on property
division and spousal support “shall apply only to divorce, i.e., the dissolution of a formal marriage.”50
Through the mid-1990s, this distinction between formal marriage and cohabitation continued.
In November 1993, when Ellman shared partial drafts of three chapters—Division of Property,
Alimony (renamed “Compensatory Payments”), and Child Support—he stressed the “inherent

40 See Ira Mark Ellman, Contract Thinking was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2001)
(explaining that the Washington Supreme Court and, subsequently, the ALI Principles chose the approach rejected by
Marvin, “assimilating unmarried cohabitants into the legal regime of marriage”). In Washington, a community property
state, if nonmarital partners are in a “committed intimate relationship” (established through a multi-factor test), there is a
rebuttable presumption that any property they acquire during cohabitation is common property, subject to equitable
distribution at the end of the relationship. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348 (Wash. 2007).
41 Principles, supra note 1, at 933, 1128.
42 Interview with Grace Blumberg, March 11, 2011 (“Blumberg Interview”).
43 Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare
State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1287 (2001).
44 Principles, supra note 1, at 914.
45 Blumberg Interview, supra note 42.
46 Id.; Interview with Ira Ellman, April 7, 2021. See Principles, supra note 1, at 921-22 (Illustrations 3 through 6).
47 See Principles, supra note 1, at 923-25 (Illustrations 7 & 11).
48 Memo from Marygold S. Melli to Participants in Conference eon the Law and Public Policy of Family Dissolution,
Jan. 4, 1990 (attaching Background Paper: Conference on the Law and Public Policy of Family Dissolution).
49 Id. at 2. To be fair, after noting that courts “generally enforce” contracts between cohabitants and flagging questions
about such contracts, the Background Paper raises the status question: “Should cohabitation give rise to economic rights
or obligations founded otherwise than in contract?” Id. at 16.
50 “Principles of the Law Governing Family Dissolution” (“Very Preliminary Draft”), attached to Background Paper.
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interdependence” of these chapters.51 He reported that no work had been done on two additional
planned chapters, Dissolution of Nonmarital Cohabiting Relationships and Premarital and Separation
Agreements, and did not discuss extending the Principles’ approach to property and alimony to
nonmarital relationships.52 By 1994, it was not clear the reporters would reach nonmarital cohabitation,
as Ellman observed that “at one time” such a chapter “was contemplated.”53
In October 1998, however, Ellman shared with the Council a preliminary draft of a chapter
called “Domestic Unions,” addressing “long-term, marriage like, nonmarital relationships.”54
Authored by Blumberg and Ellman, the chapter laid out the basic approach taken in the final version
of Chapter 6. Finding the proper terminology proved challenging: most of the advisors did not care
for the initial draft’s use of “de facto spouses” and “de facto marriage”55—terms that made vividly
clear the reporters’ functional approach. They favored “domestic partners,” but Blumberg and Ellman
worried about its “inappropriate connotation of a business relationship.”56 By 1999, Chapter 6 was
renamed “Domestic Partners.”57
At the May 2000 annual meeting, when the ALI membership first saw drafts of Chapters 6
and 7, President Wright and Blumberg presented nonmarital cohabitation as “not part of our original
agenda.” As Blumberg explained Chapter 6’s origins, “some of our Advisers, particularly the judges,
thought that [nonmarital cohabitation] needed rethinking and reformulation [and] that some of their
most troubling cases involve the dissolution of nonmarital families and that existing law was often
unsatisfactory.” Ellman stressed the limits of contract in identifying the “difficult problem” posed by
Chapters 6 and 7: “how to acknowledge the importance of contract without forgetting that the
contract rubric can never provide a complete description of family relations.”58
In presenting Chapter 6, Blumberg observed the fast-changing landscape at home and abroad
concerning nonmarital cohabitation. She recollected Wright urging, “early in the history of this
project,” to look at “foreign law as well as to American law,” and commented that the reporters “took
this advice most to heart . . . with nonmarital cohabitation.”59 As Blumberg documented in her 1981
article,60 other countries took a functional approach under which, as she explained to the ALI, they
“look to the social behavior of the parties [and] to objective facts rather than to subjective intentions.”
Blumberg contrasted the “American contractual treatment” with this functional approach, which
generally asked, “does this nonmarital family look like a marital family?,” and if it did, applied “some
or all of the family law” concerning dissolution to a “nonmarital family.”61

Memorandum from Reporter Ira Ellman to the Council, “An Overview of Existing Law and the Project’s Current
Status,” November 11, 1993.
52 Id. at 1.
53 Memorandum from Reporter Ira Mark Ellman to Council, Nov. 11, 1994, at 1. Ellman also indicates it is “no longer
feasible” to draft a chapter on Agreements, “given the time available to complete the project.” Id. at 23-24.
54 Chapter 6, Domestic Unions, attached to Memo from Chief Reporter Ira Mark Ellman to Council of the American
Law Institute, on submission for October Council Meeting, Sept. 27, 1998.
55 Memo from Chief Reporter Ira Mark Ellman to Council of the American Law Institute, on submission for October
Council Meeting, Sept. 27, 1998.
56 Id.
57 Memo on Chapter 6 from Grace Blumberg to Advisers and Members Consultative group, Sept. 24, 1999.
58 Monday Morning Session – May 15, 2000, 77 A.L.I. Proc. 3, 29-30 (2000).
59 Id.
60 See Blumberg, supra note 24, at 1170-78.
61 Monday Morning Session, supra note 61, at 32.
51
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By focusing on the lived reality of families, the reporters developed a functional approach that
led them to craft “a unitary system,” under which “the same rules apply to all sorts of couples.”62
Thus, the “foundation” for Chapter 6 was “the equitable concerns” expressed in Chapters 4 and 5,
which “define and rationalize the claims that one spouse has upon another at the termination of a
marriage” unless they explicitly agree—pursuant to Chapter 7—not to be “subject to these equitable
rules.” Since Chapter 6 sought to reach “marriage-like cohabitation,” the reporters attempted to draft
“rules that would distinguish relationships that are marriage-like from those that are not.”63 The
duration of a relationship for a “significant period” would trigger a presumption that the couple were
domestic partners, rebuttable by evidence that the parties “did not share life together as a couple.”64
The Principles propose a shorter period if the couple maintains a “common household” with “their
common child.” If a couple does not meet the state-determined time threshold, Section 6.03(6) allows
one party—using a multi-factor test—to try to establish that they shared a primary residence and a life
together as a couple for a “significant” period of time.65
If the Principles were adopted, the default would shift from a rule that unmarried cohabitants
have no economic obligations to each other arising from their shared life—absent an agreement to
engage in such sharing—to a rule that they did, absent an express agreement otherwise. Blumberg
noted the influence of Canada and Australia and, domestically, the inspiration of Washington’s case
law.66
4. Competing Assessments of the Functional Approach: Weakening Marriage or Fostering
Equality and Diversity?
At the 2001 annual meeting, hints of the ongoing culture wars over marriage seeped into the
debate over domestic partners. Some members objected that Chapter 6 gave legitimacy to same-sex
relationships; conservative family law scholar Lynn Wardle asserted: “what you are proposing is samesex domestic partnership, which overwhelmingly is, I think, a bad idea.” Others commented that
because issues of marriage and nonmarriage implicated “religious beliefs” and “state power,”
“caution” counseled the ALI waiting until “society itself has a clearer version of what kinds of more
permanent relationships are entered into.” One suggestion was to add a proviso of nonendorsement
of “these kinds of relationships.” Supporters countered that the issue was not whether nonmarital
relationships were “good, bad, [or] moral,” but the “reality” that such relationships exist and that
lawyers, judges, and others needed “rational guidance” about how to address them when they end.67
Blumberg’s response was pro-marriage but also attentive to the “social fact” of “informal
unions.”68 She reminded critics that the commentary took a position preferring marriage as “more
orderly” and “regular,” while attempting to deal with the increasing rate of cohabitation. The
Reporters were not “endorsing” nonmarital relationships. To the contrary: “All three of us are happily
married, and . . . I don’t know about my Co-Reporters, but I have never cohabited (laughter) and I
would urge my daughter not to also.” Because marriage is “an umbrella of benefits flowing from third
parties, the state, and between the parties,” Blumberg continued, “I would tell my daughter to marry,
because she is much better protected by the institution of marriage.” Chapter 6, she clarified, simply
aims to “deal with the dissolution” of nonmarital relationships, reflecting the concerns of the judges
Monday Afternoon Session – May 15, 2000, 77 A.L.I. Proc. 47, 93 (2000).
Monday Morning Session, supra note 61, at 31.
64 Principles, supra note 1, at 916-17.
65 Id.
66 Monday Morning Session, supra note 61, at 31-32.
67 Id. at 36, 43-45.
68 Monday afternoon session, supra note 62, at 51.
62
63
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who expressed the need for rules to address the “nonmarital families” coming before them. In a
comment signaling support for greater equality among families, Blumberg explained that the reporters
did not add stronger language favoring marriage because, in an environment in which same-sex
couples have “no right to marry,” but have access to an “equivalent institution” (like the civil union
in Vermont), “we would certainly not want to take a position against that equivalent institution.”69
On one view, the ALI’s scheme of bringing domestic partnership under the umbrella of
marriage law—with respect to economic consequences at dissolution—may appear moderate. Rather
than creating a range of relationship statuses from which individuals could choose, the Principles
solidified the primacy of marriage by expressing a preference for marriage while extending divorce
rules to nonmarital cohabitation. The drafters also distinguished the debate over same-sex marriage in
Hawaii and Vermont from the “quite modest” focus of the remedies in Chapter 6, which did not
address “the relationship between the couple as a unit and third parties and the state.”70
Chapter 6’s insistence on a status rather than contract paradigm, however, could also appear
progressive, given the legal and political landscape of the late 1990s. Under Marvin, a contract-based
remedy would not entitle a cohabitant, when a relationship dissolved, to divorce remedies; Marvin
rejected assimilating nonmarital dissolution to marital dissolution. Both Blumberg and Ellman had
criticized Marvin;71 Blumberg reiterated that criticism when presenting Chapter 6 at the 2000 ALI
meeting: applying “the rubric of contract rather than family law, to the rights and obligations of
nonmarital cohabitants” for the last 25 years had “provoked considerable dissatisfaction.”72 The
Principles’ proposal to use a status-based approach pressed a new direction for family law—one
focused on the reality of intimate relationships.
Given the legal and political climate with respect to same-sex marriage, the Principles’ choice
to treat different-sex and same-sex cohabiting couples the same with respect to their entitlement to
marriage-like remedies recognized and accommodated LGBTQ family formation. As importantly, the
Principles assumed a functional equivalence not only between same-sex and different-sex cohabitants,
but also between same-sex cohabitants and different-sex spouses. This point was not lost on the ALI’s
supporters or its critics.
Of the various chapters addressing adult relationships, Chapter 6 received by far the most
attention in commentary published in the immediate wake of approval of the Principles.73 In
convening a symposium on the Principles at Brigham Young University, Lynn Wardle charged the
drafters with going “far beyond existing law” in recommending “official recognition of homosexual
and extramarital concubine-like domestic partnerships, on an economic par with marriage.”74 Other
participants predicted that the Principles would threaten and erode the institution of marriage75 and
undermine the traditional, gender-differentiated, heterosexual family.76
Monday Morning Session, supra note 61, at 44, 46.
Id. at 37 (Ellman).
71 Blumberg, supra note 24; Ellman, supra note 39.
72 Monday Morning Session, supra note 61, at 31.
73 See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, Introduction to the Symposium on the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
2001:3 BYU L. REV. i (2001) (observing that “the bulk of the presentations at the BYU Symposium” focused on Chapters
2 and 6).
74 Id. at ii.
75 William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 961
(2001).
76 F. Carolyn Graglia, A Nonfeminist’s Perspective on Mothers and Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI’s Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (2001). A few contributors offered qualified praise for Chapter 6. See
69
70
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A very different view emerged from a competing symposium in the Duke Journal of Gender Law
and Policy. Dean Herma Hill Kay (an Adviser to the Principles project) commended the drafters for
endeavoring to “complete the divorce law reforms begun in the 1960s,” including addressing
“unresolved” gender issues that remained “embedded in the law and practice of family dissolution.”77
While Wardle contended that the Principles went far beyond existing law, Kay noted that several
commentators to the Duke symposium faulted the Principles for being too much like a “Restatement”
in adhering to current law concerning property division, instead of taking the opportunity to correct
state law, for example, through treating human capital as property.78 Some commentators stressed the
negative gendered effects of the drafters’ choices, such as not taking account of non-financial losses,79
while others emphasized positive effects, such as compensating working mothers for loss due to
caretaking for children.80
In contrast to the concerns raised in the BYU symposium, the Duke commentators praised
the Principles for opening up “a range of possibilities” for “gay and lesbian couples in particular.”81
While some faulted it for “retaining the status of marriage as normatively superior to domestic
partnerships,” they also recognized that, if widely adopted, the Principles could promote equality
among families by nudging the law toward “recognizing a wider range of relationships.”82
***
More than twenty years after Blumberg’s observations about “dissatisfaction” over the limits
of contract for addressing inter se economic obligations between cohabitants, that “dissatisfaction” is
unabated.83 Critics highlight that cohabitants seldom recover for engaging in the very sharing behavior
that Blumberg and Ellman identified, and they point to the harms inflicted particularly on women in
different-sex relationships, who invest in the household and childcare.84
Meanwhile, a primary constituency for the ALI’s approach to nonmarital cohabitation—samesex couples—has gained access to a status-based framework—marriage. Blumberg predicted in 2001
that same-sex couples’ quest for marriage could “shed useful light on the social and welfare functions
of the family, whether marital or nonmarital.”85 But as a practical matter, marriage equality has meant
that the dominant force in reform for nonmarital relationships is no longer as engaged or as powerful.

Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and
Ordinances, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2001); Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommendation,
2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1135 (2001).
77 Herma Hill Kay, Foreword, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY ii, ii-iii (2001).
78 Id. at iv (citing Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve
Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 124 (2001); Allan M. Parkman, The ALI Principles and Marital Quality, 8
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 162 (2001); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Vacant Promises? The ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution and the Post-Divorce Financial Circumstances of Women, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 177 (2001)).
79 Katharine B. Silbaugh, Gender and Nonfinancial Matters in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 203 (2001).
80 Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support Takes on the Mommy Track: Why the ALI Proposal Is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151 (2001).
81 Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 87 (2001).
82 Martha M. Ertman, The ALI Principles’ Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107 (2001).
83 See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U.L.R. 2139 (2019); Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Contracts,
73 STAN. L. REV. (2021).
84 Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, supra note 81.
85 Blumberg, supra note 43, at 1309-1310.
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Nonetheless, a fierce debate continues over how family law should address unmarried
couples. The ALI’s position may not be the dominant approach, but it remains an influential
alternative that many strongly support. Disagreements that aired upon publication of the Principles
continue. Scholars, judges, lawmakers, and lawyers disagree over whether cohabitation and marriage
are functional equivalents warranting the same economic rules at dissolution. And they diverge over
whether a status-based approach disregards or respects autonomy and choice.86 An illustrative example
is the Uniform Law Commission’s recently approved Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act
(UCERA). The leaders of that project have adhered to a contract-based approach, even rejecting the
ALI’s view as “radical.” Their critics have pressed for status-based provisions, appealing to the
Principles as a superior model.87 Even when not adopted, the ALI’s position shapes the terms of
debate.
II.

PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

The law had long protected parent-child relations within marriage and treated nonmarital
children as “illegitimate.”88 In the 1960s and 1970s, courts and legislatures repudiated this
discriminatory regime.89 Even though law would no longer routinely treat unmarried fathers as legal
strangers to their children,90 distinctions remained between marital and nonmarital parents. When a
married woman gave birth, her husband was treated as the legal father even if he was not the biological
father.91 But when an unmarried woman gave birth, the father’s parentage was premised on a biological
connection. What, then, should happen to children raised by an unmarried mother and a man who
was not the biological father?
The Principles’ drafters viewed marital status-based inequality as a problem in its own right.
But the marital-status distinction implicated another emergent equality concern—sexual orientation.92
Excluded from marriage, same-sex couples raising children were necessarily doing so outside of
marriage. Tackling sexual orientation inequality meant tackling the role of biology in parenthood.
While the paradigmatic unmarried different-sex couple was raising their own biological child, the
paradigmatic same-sex couple included a nonbiological parent.93 Accordingly, premising nonmarital
parental recognition on biological connection was especially harmful to LGBTQ parents. Absent a
second-parent adoption, which only a handful of jurisdictions authorized at the time, only the
biological parent would be treated as a legal parent. The nonbiological parent lacked standing to seek
custody upon dissolution.94
Given these concerns with inequality, the question of parental recognition—and therefore
who has standing to seek custody—became an important feature of the ALI’s work on custody. In
86 See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Beyond Property: The Other Legal Consequences of Informal Relationships, 51 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1325, 1322-33 (2019) (summarizing some of the literature). Compare June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76
MD. L. REV. 55 (2016) (raising autonomy arguments against status-based remedies for nonmarital partners), with Courtney
G. Joslin, Autonomy in the Family, 66 UCLA L. REV. 912, 972–73 (2019) (challenging autonomy arguments against statusbased remedies and arguing that conventional approach fails to further “choice” in family forms).
87 See infra Conclusion.
88 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434-47.
89 See Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).
90 See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292 (2016).
91 See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2272 (2017).
92 Interview with Katharine Bartlett, Jan. 19, 2021 (“Bartlett Interview”).
93 See NeJaime, supra note 91, at 2297.
94 See Douglas NeJaime, The Story of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: Parental Recognition in the Age of LGBT Equality, in
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 245 (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019).
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what follows, we show how the Principles’ definition of “parent” evolved over time in ways that grew
to include nonmarital, nonbiological parents and to treat them more like legal parents. We then show
how the ALI’s approach staked out important ground in an emergent debate in family law and
ultimately shaped developments in parentage law at the state level.
A. Towards Functional Parenthood
As the influential work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit had taught in the
1970s, from a child’s perspective, a parent-child relationship does not depend on a biological or legal
connection.95 Instead, the child’s relationship to her “psychological parent” grew out of the day-today interactions between parent and child.96 This experiential understanding of parenthood came to
animate a functional approach—reflecting the realities of family life, rather than turning on formal
markers like marriage or biology.
Such an approach was not prominent in the early stages of the ALI project. At the initial 1990
conference, original reporter Marygold Melli drew attention to “informal families” and “same gender
intimate relationships,” but said nothing about nonbiological parents in nonmarital families.97 When
the drafters eventually addressed “the role of the psychological parent” in an early draft on custody,
they focused on stepparents.98 The 1992 preliminary draft, which provided that a “stepparent . . . may
be awarded parental authority and physical custody,”99 continued to view parent-child relations within
the paradigm of the heterosexual marital family.
The addition of reporter Katharine Bartlett in 1995 changed the direction—and ambition—
of the ALI’s treatment of parent-child relationships. Bartlett had written on questions of parenthood
in ways that challenged law’s traditional assumptions. She defended nonmarital families, questioned
the role of biological connection, and suggested that a child may have more than two parents.100
Bartlett’s commitment to a functional approach first emerged in her treatment of custodial
responsibility, the subject of Chapter 2. The preliminary draft that Bartlett shared in 1995—which
represented “a new start” on the custody chapter101—emphasized past caretaking as the basis on which
to allocate custodial responsibility between parents whose relationship dissolved.102 Future custodial
arrangements should reflect the realities of the family’s pre-dissolution life, aspiring to “continuity and
stability in the child’s primary parent-child attachment or attachments.”103 But a rule that applied to
“parents” required the ALI to answer the question: Who is a parent?
1. De Facto Parent
The ALI began from the premise that “parent” meant legal parent. The draft defined the
“parent-child relationship” to cover “relationships between child and parent as defined under
See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
See id.
97 Conference on the Law and Public Policy of Family Dissolution, Background Paper 2-3 (Jan. 4, 1990); Memo to
Participants in Conference on the Law and Public Policy of Family Dissolution, from Marygold S. Melli (Jan. 4, 1990).
98 Preliminary Draft No. 1, §7.26 (p. 11) (1992).
99 Preliminary Draft No. 3, §7.26 (p. 8) (1992).
100 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of
the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-83 (1984).
101 Memo to Advisers, Members’ Consultative Group, from Kate Bartlett and Ira Ellman 1 (May 8, 1995).
102 Preliminary Draft No. 5 at 10-11 (1995). See also Memo to Advisers, Members Consultative Group, from Kate
Bartlett 1 (May 8, 1995). Bartlett’s approach here was influenced by Elizabeth Scott’s foundational article. See Elizabeth S.
Scott, Pluralism, Paternal Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992).
103 Preliminary Draft No. 5, § 2.02(2)(b) (p. 29) (1995).
95
96
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applicable state law”—at a time when state law definitions largely defined parent in ways that excluded
unmarried nonbiological parents. Nonetheless, Bartlett sought to “recognize[] the parenting interests
of adults who are not biological or adoptive parents but who have functioned as the child’s parents in
certain circumstances.” Even as the draft defined the “parent-child relationship” to include
“functionally-defined parent-child relationships,” it treated them formally as “non-parents.”104 The
“interests of [these] non-parents,” Bartlett affirmed, “ordinarily are subordinate to those of the
parents.”105
The functional perspective on parenthood, and its blurring of the parent/non-parent
distinction, eventually unsettled the drafters’ initial assumption that state law would control the
definition of “parent.” By 1997, Bartlett had adopted the term “functional parent” alongside “legal
parent,” and was extending custodial rights to both.106 Whereas the 1996 draft had used the heading,
“Allocations of Residential Responsibility to Persons Other than Parents,” the 1997 draft used the
heading, “Allocations of Residential Responsibility to Persons Other than Legal Parents.”107
By early 1998, when ALI members first received a tentative draft on “the allocation of
responsibility for children,”108 the term “de facto parent” had replaced “functional parent.” The draft
explained that “a parent is either a legal parent or a de facto parent.”109 Ultimately, in the final version
of the Principles, a de facto parent was defined as “an individual . . . who, for a significant period of
time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial
compensation . . . regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the
parent with whom the child primarily lived.”110
The inclusion of de facto parent provisions exemplified the functional approach’s capacity to
mitigate inequality. Nonbiological parents in same-sex couples could qualify as de facto parents. (While
the 1995 draft’s two illustrations of functional parents involved only a different-sex couple,111 the 1996
draft featured a same-sex couple who had raised a child from birth.112) Nonetheless, the Principles
relegated de facto parents to a lesser status entitled to fewer rights than legal parents.113
Treating nonbiological parents in same-sex couples as less than full parents was problematic.
The 1990s had witnessed groundbreaking work on parental recognition for LGBTQ parents. Bartlett
herself was influenced by Nancy Polikoff’s work,114 particularly a 1990 article making the case for
functional parenthood to protect lesbian parents and their children.115 The Principles had more work
to do to vindicate same-sex couples’ families. Ultimately, many more parents would be captured by a
new, and increasingly expansive, functional category—parent by estoppel.
Id. at 21, 41-42, 47).
Memo to Advisers, Members Consultative Group, from Kate Bartlett 1 (May 8, 1995).
106 Memo to Advisers and Members’ Consultative Group, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, from Reporter
Katharine T. Bartlett xi (June 2, 1997); Preliminary Draft No. 7, § 2.03(a), (b) (1997).
107 Preliminary Draft No. 4, §§ 2.03, 2.21 (1997) (emphasis added). See also Council Draft No. 7, § 2.21 (1997).
108 Memo to Members of The American Law Institute, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett xxvi (Feb. 16, 1998).
109 Tentative Draft No. 3, § 2.03 (p. 37) (1998). See also Preliminary Draft No. 8, § 2.03 (p. 14) (1998).
110 Principles, supra note 1, § 2.03 Definitions.
111 Preliminary Draft No. 5, § 2.03 (p. 48) (1995).
112 Preliminary Draft No. 6, § 2.21, Illustration (p. 354) (1996).
113 See, e.g., Preliminary Draft No. 7, § 2.21 (pp. 392-93) (1997); Memo to Members and Advisers, Family Dissolution
Project, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 1 (Sept. 17, 1999) (“The rights of de facto parents were inferior in certain
respects to those of legal parents.”).
114 Bartlett Interview, supra note 92.
115 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in LesbianMother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO L.J. 459 (1990).
104
105
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2. Parent by Estoppel
In 1998, Bartlett recognized the temptation to devote more attention to the category of
“parent,” even as the drafters were reluctant “to break any new ground.”116 Seemingly in response to
feedback from the ALI membership, Bartlett noted that since the child support chapter (Chapter 3)
drew on estoppel principles by preventing individuals from denying support obligations based on their
prior conduct, “it may seem unbalanced or even inconsistent not to recognize a comparable principle
in Chapter 2.”117 The preliminary draft circulated in 1998 altered the definition of “legal parent” to
include an individual “upon whom a child obligation has [been] imposed under Chapter 3.”118 Bartlett
framed the concept as both a logical analogue to the child support chapter and a natural outgrowth
of the custody chapter’s “functional emphasis.”119
By the 1998 Council draft a few months later, this new category stood on its own. The notion
of “parent” had coalesced around three separate categories: legal parent, parent by estoppel, and de
facto parent.120 The parent by estoppel category included not only a man with a child support
obligation but also “a man who acted as the child’s father for a significant period of time . . . under
the reasonable good faith belief that he was the child’s biological father.”121
The parent by estoppel approach reached nonbiological parents in nonmarital families and
treated them like legal parents. But it remained tethered to the heterosexual family. After all, a
nonbiological parent in a same-sex couple could not have a reasonable, good-faith belief that she was
the child’s biological parent. Given this shortcoming, Bartlett’s work on parent by estoppel was
unfinished. Indeed, she noted in the 1998 Council draft that she had “reserved [a] section for parent
status created by agreement.”122
By 1999, Bartlett presented the Council with an additional parent by estoppel path, covering
individuals who functioned as parents under an agreement with the legal parent.123 Unlike the other
parent by estoppel pathways, Bartlett framed this new pathway in expressly gender-neutral terms—
“holding himself or herself out as the child’s parent”124—thus offering a path to parental standing to

116

1998).

Memo to Advisers and Judges and Members Consultative Groups, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 9 (June 9,

117 Id. While we do not analyze Chapter 3 (authored by Blumberg and Ellman), we note that it reflected the reporters
concerns with the unequal economic conditions facing children and their custodial parents (primarily, mothers) after
divorce. The Principles’ approach to child support departed from the prevailing American method, which produced
insufficient support for children whose residential parent earned substantially less than the nonresidential parent. To
mitigate this problem, the Principles elaborated a child-support formula that accounted for not only the absolute but also
the relative income of parents, explaining that “the residential parent’s interest is not to bear disproportionately the
financial costs of childrearing” and “not being disadvantaged, compared to the child’s other parent, by the financial
opportunity costs of residential responsibility.” Principles, supra note 1, § 3.04.
118 Preliminary Draft No. 8, § 2.03 (p. 14) (1998).
119 Memo to Members and Advisers, Family Dissolution Project, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 1 (Sept. 17,
1999).
120 Council Draft No. 5, § 2.03 (1998).
121 Memo to Members of the Council, The American Law Institute, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett xvi (Sept.
25, 1998); Council Draft No. 5, § 2.03 (pp. 123-24) (1998). In the final version, the “significant period” become “at least
two years.” § 2.03 Definitions.
122 Council Draft No. 5, § 2.03 (p. 124) (1998).
123 Council Draft No. 6 § 2.03 (1999). See also Memo to Members and Advisers, Family Dissolution Project, from
Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 1 (Sept. 17, 1999).
124 Memo to Members and Advisers, supra note 119, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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nonbiological mothers in same-sex couples. Indeed, the Principles instructed that determinations
“should not turn upon whether the parties are of the same sex or different sexes.”125
In the final Principles, a “parent by estoppel” included an individual who
lived with the child since the child’s birth . . . or . . . lived with the child for at least two
years, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent,
pursuant to an agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents,
both parents), when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in
the child’s best interests.126
This new pathway offered a way for both parents in a same-sex couple to stand in legal parity, given
that “[t]he rights and privileges of a legal parent and a parent by estoppel are the same, and superior
in some respects to those of a de facto parent.”127
Ultimately, the 2000 draft presented to the ALI membership included the three categories of
parent—legal parent, parent by estoppel, and de facto parent128—with parent by estoppel in its new,
more expansive form. Bartlett explained that, during the drafting process, she and her colleagues
confronted “questions about allocating responsibility for children who are the product of
nontraditional family arrangements, including those arising from nontraditional reproductive
methods, de facto parenting arrangements, and custodial agreements.” While earlier drafts had
“referred most questions concerning these matters to existing state law,” the drafters ultimately
decided “to address some of these earlier unattended issues”—doing so in ways that were “in keeping
with the Chapter’s emphasis on the functional components of parenting.”129 Progressives cheered the
ALI’s functional parent provisions,130 specifically pointing to how they vindicated LGBTQ families.131
But conservatives objected.132 “[W]ith validation of same-sex domestic partnerships and of
homosexual parenting,” one critic charged, the ALI had become a leader in “the feminist march to
complete androgyny.”133
3. Assigning Custodial Responsibility
Once it was clear who had standing to seek custody, the decisionmaker would need
instructions on how to adjudicate disputes. This, of course, was originally envisioned as the primary
work of Chapter 2, before Bartlett pursued the very definition of “parent.” To operationalize the best
Principles, supra note 1, § 2.03(b) Definitions.
Id., § 2.03 Definitions.
127 Memo to Council of the American Law Institute, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 1 (Nov. 12, 1999).
128 Principles, supra note 1, § 2.03 Definitions.
129 Memo to Members of The American Law Institute, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett xxxvi-xxxviii (Feb. 25,
2000).
130 See, e.g., David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 1075, 1103 (“The boldness of chapter 2's custody provisions lies chiefly in the provisions' expansion of the concept
of parenthood and the accompanying erosion of the privileged status traditionally reserved for biological and adoptive
parents.”).
131 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen
Donors Are Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 90 (2000) (noting that the “ALI Principles . . . rejected linking parental
rights inevitably and exclusively to biology” and thereby “rises to the challenge posed by [planned lesbian and gay]
families”).
132 See, e.g., David M. Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law:
Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on De Facto Parenthood, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1186 (objecting to the de facto parent
category, arguing that “what children really need are . . . one or preferably two natural or adoptive parents”).
133 See, e.g., F. Carolyn Graglia, A Nonfeminist’s Perspectives of Mothers and Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 993, 1012.
125
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interest of the child standard, which had long been criticized as indeterminate, the Principles adopted
a more concrete approach.134 Articulated in the very first draft that Bartlett circulated, the “past
allocation of care” standard made it to the final version. Reflecting the child-centered concerns
centered by a functional approach, the standard uses the facts of past caretaking as the basis for future
custodial arrangements.135
The “past allocation of care” standard also sought to vindicate gender equality. Some men
criticized the drafters’ approach for failing to recognize the rights of fathers.136 Instead of adopting a
joint custody framework, with its purportedly gender-neutral approach to parenting, the drafters
adopted a functional standard that, while formally gender-neutral, recognized the disproportionate
caretaking work done by women in different-sex couples.137 Moreover, by adopting a clear rule rather
than an abstract standard, their approach would reduce the need for women to bargain away financial
rights in exchange for custodial rights.138
Under the Principles’ approach, not all parents enjoyed equal access to custody. Courts were
instructed to depart from the “past allocation of care” in disputes involving de facto parents. A court
“should not allocate the majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of
a legal parent or a parent by estoppel,” and a de facto parent may be denied parenting time altogether
“if, in light of the number of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would be
impractical.”139
Ultimately, the treatment of de facto parents exhibited both the promise and constraints of a
functional approach at the start of the 21st century. As Bartlett explained, “greater recognition of
individuals who are not legal parents but who have lived with the child and functioned in a parental
role” was “consistent with the emphasis on past caretaking patterns.”140 Yet, even as the Principles’
approach to custodial responsibility used past caretaking as the relevant measure, it minimized this
factor when assigning custody to de facto parents.141
B. The Rise of Functional Parenthood
The Principles’ account of parenthood, which developed in conversation with courts and
scholars, contributed to evolving understandings of parentage—one that is reflected in legislative
enactments, judicial decisions, and scholarly arguments. Situating the ALI’s approach in family law
developments illuminates how the ALI pushed a functional agenda that sought to mitigate troubling
inequalities in existing family law. At the same time, appreciating the ALI’s relatively early intervention

Preliminary Draft No. 5, Introductory Discussion at 4-5 (1995).
Principles, supra note 1, § 2.02(e) (“the continuity of existing parent-child attachments after the break-up of a family
unit is a factor critical to the child's well-being”).
136 Bartlett Interview, supra note 92.
137 Id.
138 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950 (1979).
139 Principles, supra note 1, § 2.18.
140 Memo to Members of the Council, The American Law Institute, from Reporter Katharine T. Bartlett 1-2 (Sept.
24, 1997).
141 See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
769, 782 (1999) (observing that “the Principles are a step forward for nonlegal parents,” but, “this step, as are perhaps
most steps in the law, is a small step”); Sarah H. Ramsay, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by Estoppel and De
Facto Parents Under the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY’ 285,
301 (2001) (“On balance the Principles are a positive, incremental step toward recognizing families that do not fit the
nuclear family model.”).
134
135
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in family law’s functional turn helps make sense of some of the ways in which law has departed from
the ALI’s approach even as it has pursued the ALI’s functional aims.
Of course, the most straightforward form of influence would be adoption. There are some
examples of this, including in the parentage context. Nearing the end of the ALI drafting process, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the ALI’s approach to recognize de facto parents—
doing so in a dispute involving a same-sex couple.142 The court drew on the ALI’s reasoning to support
a child-centered approach that maintains children’s relationships with de facto parents.143
Other states, though, did not expressly adopt the ALI’s approach to parentage. Nonetheless,
the Principles served as authority to support functional parenthood, even when the standards
articulated by the court broke from the specifics of the ALI. For example, in a pathbreaking decision
adopting a de facto parent doctrine in 2000, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that “our position
here is in harmony with the principles recently adopted by the American Law Institute,” which “has
recognized that individuals who have been significantly involved in caring for and supporting children
and for whom they have acted as parents may obtain legal recognition of their parental rights to
visitation and custody.”144 Beyond supporting general acceptance of functional parent doctrines,
courts turned to the ALI for more specific guidance.145 For instance, after a landmark 2005 decision
in which the Washington Supreme Court looked to the ALI as it adopted de facto parentage,146 a lower
court in the state relied heavily on the ALI’s fact-sensitive explanations in extending de facto parent
status to a foster parent.147
Of course, some courts have resisted the functional turn.148 In such cases, the ALI has
appeared as authority in dissents advocating functional doctrines.149 In some jurisdictions, those
dissenting positions have eventually become the governing rule. Consider developments in Maryland.
When the Maryland high court rejected de facto parentage in 2008 in a case involving an unmarried
same-sex couple, the dissent quoted the ALI’s parent by estoppel provisions to support its view that
the court should “hold that a de facto parent stands in legal parity with a legal parent.”150 In reversing
that decision in 2016 in another case involving a same-sex couple, the Maryland high court looked to
a range of family law authorities. It observed in case law from other states a “modern common law
trend of recognizing the status of de facto parents,” noted that “family law scholarship and the academic
See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
See Youmans, 711 N.E.2d at 172-73.
144 Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974-75 (R.I. 2000). See also Stitham v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598, 605-06 (Me.
2001).
145 See, e.g., Young v. King, 208 A.3d 762, 766 (Me. 2019) (drawing on the Principles in concluding that a de facto
parent’s failure to adopt the child is relevant to but not dispositive of the legal parent’s acceptance of the de facto parent’s
parental role).
146 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005). See also Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 302
(Me. 2000). See also K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 807 n.6 (Pa. 2012) (drawing on the Principles in endorsing a paternity
by estoppel doctrine that includes a required showing of the child’s best interests).
147 See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d 889, 895-96 (Wash. App. 2011).
148 Yet, the recent trend looks quite different than the pessimistic assessment that ALI critic Robin Wilson provided
in 2010. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2010) (“While courts have looked to the Principles for guidance on this topic more than
any other, they have rejected the ALI’s approach twice as often as they have accepted it.”).
149 See, e.g., Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 438 n.22 (Vt. 2014) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (“The American Law
Institute has likewise recognizing that parental rights can arise from intentions and conduct, rather than biology or legal
ties.”); Chaterjee v. Chaterjee, 253 P.3D 915, 934 (N.M. App. 2011) (Vigil, J. dissenting) (drawing support from the ALI’s
protection of a “child’s relationship with an adult who has functioned as a parent”). See also Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 711
N.W.2d 759, 774 (Mich. App. 2005) (Cooper, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150 See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 101 & n.5 (Md. 2008) (Raker, J., dissenting).
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literature have also endorsed the notion that a functional relationship . . . can be used to define
parenthood,” and explained that the ALI “recommended expanding the definition of parenthood to
include de facto parent as one of the parties with standing to bring an action for the determination of
custody.” Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he weight of authority outside Maryland reinforces
our decision to overturn [our earlier decision] and recognize de facto parenthood.”151
The ALI’s direct influence may have been compromised by its choice of terminology—itself
a sign of the time at which the Principles were drafted. As Bartlett crafted the functional parent
concepts, the leading authority on de facto parent status was the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1995
decision in In re H.S.H.-K.152 Chief Justice Shirley Abramson, who wrote that opinion, was an Adviser
to the Principles and in conversation with Bartlett about these issues.153 In H.S.H.-K., which featured
a same-sex couple, the court ruled that the nonbiological mother could be treated as a de facto parent
and thus seek visitation. This was a landmark decision for LGBTQ rights and functional parenthood.
Nonetheless, the de facto parent was not a legal parent under Wisconsin law and was not entitled to
the rights (and responsibilities) of legal parents.
Accordingly, when Bartlett was developing the ALI’s account of functional parenthood, de
facto parent status was not understood as the equivalent of legal parenthood. When the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court adopted de facto parenthood a few years later, it relied directly on the ALI in
articulating a status entitled only to standing to seek visitation.154 Chief Justice Marshall, who served
on the ALI Council and was also in conversation with Bartlett, joined that opinion.155
In this sense, the dialogue between courts and the ALI produced a particular view of de facto
parenthood—one that protected nonbiological parents in same-sex couples but offered less than full
parenthood. Over time, this de facto parent doctrine would come to appear insufficient and
discriminatory.
Today, most jurisdictions that recognize a comprehensive form of functional parenthood do
so through a de facto parent doctrine. Further, the doctrine in many of these jurisdictions emerged in
part from disputes involving same-sex couples. De facto parentage, on this modern view, yields
parental rights and responsibilities.156 Most recently, states, including those following the 2017
Uniform Parentage Act, have codified de facto parentage, making clear that it is merely another path
to legal parentage.157
See Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 439 n.6, 449, 451 (Md. 2016).
See id. at 447.
153 See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); Bartlett Interview, supra note 92.
154 See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
155 See id. at 886; Bartlett Interview, supra note 92. In an earlier opinion, Marshall endorsed de facto parentage,
specifically adopting the term “proposed by the Reporters on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.”
Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Mass. 1999).
156 See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005). Unlike the ALI’s de facto parent category, which
could include “individuals who have not necessarily held themselves out as parents,” Memo to Members of the American
Law Institute, supra note 129, at xxxviii, modern de facto parentage generally requires that the individual formed a parentchild relationship, and in some states looks to whether the individual held the child out as her child.. De facto parentage,
on this approach, is parentage, while the ALI’s version looks more like a non-parental status common in third-party
visitation statutes. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.4 (2020); UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2018).
157 See CONN. PUB. ACT. 21-15, § 38 (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 501 - 502 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26A.440 (2020); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Even the ALI’s ongoing restatement project
on Children and the Law views de facto parent status in a more robust way than the earlier Principles. Am. Law Inst.,
Restatement of the Law, Children and the Law, Tentative Draft No. 2, § 1.82 (p. 63) (March 20, 2019). The draft
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From this perspective, we can see how it would be inadequate simply to examine state
adoption of the ALI’s recommendations as a measure of their influence.158 Functional parenthood has
different names and meanings in different places. Indeed, counting jurisdictions that have de facto
parent doctrines may reveal less about the influence of the ALI’s de facto parent provisions and more
about the parent by estoppel provisions, which treated functional parents as equivalent to legal parents.
In this sense, parent by estoppel in the Principles is more analogous to what many courts and
legislatures today call de facto parent.159 Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court noted the similarity
between the comprehensive de facto parent doctrine it adopted in 2005 and the ALI’s parent by
estoppel category.160
Parent by estoppel covered an individual who, pursuant to a co-parenting agreement with the
legal parent, held out the child as their child. Such language sounded in registers familiar to
presumptions of parentage long part of state family law regimes. The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973,
adopted by nearly twenty states, provided that “[a] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child
if . . . while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his natural child.”161 This presumption aimed to capture unmarried biological fathers
who had assumed a parental role in the child’s life. But by the turn of the century, a biological limitation
on the “holding out” presumption was contested. By 2002, the California Supreme Court ruled that
the lack of a biological connection did not necessarily rebut the presumption.162 A man, or woman,
who was not the biological parent could attain parentage based simply on the conduct of “holding
out.”163
At the time of the ALI drafters’ work, it was unclear whether the “holding out” presumption
would meaningfully move in a nonbiological direction. Perhaps trading on this existing concept might
have only confused the ALI’s proposals with those of the Uniform Law Commission. More
importantly, the drafters’ very approach to functional parenthood seemed to preclude resort to the
“holding out” presumption to capture functional parenthood. The drafters were clear that state law
defined who was a legal parent, and state law included presumptions of parentage.164 It would have
made little sense to then offer a non-legal category that tracked the “holding out” presumption that
existed in many states. Accordingly, the functional parent status that would approximate legal parental
status fell under a term, estoppel, that sounded in equity, rather than law.

Restatement explains that its “definition of a de facto parent reflects the spirit of the Principles . . . but differs in [important]
respects.” Id. § 1.82 (p. 67). Unlike the Principles,” under the Restatement, “a court may award a de facto parent primary
custodial responsibility if it is in the child’s best interests.” Even as the Restatement characterizes de facto parents as “third
parties,” it treats them like legal parents—“similar to the [2017] Uniform Parentage Act’s . . . definition.” Id. § 1.82 (pp.
63, 65).
158 See Clisham & Wilson, supra note 3, at 576 (“While we cannot say definitively that the Principles have not had some
legislative influence somewhere, if legislatures are borrowing from the Principles, they are certainly not tipping their
hands.”).
159 Memo to Members of The American Law Institute, supra note 129, at xxxviii (“The rights and privileges of a parent
by estoppel are the same as those of a legal parent.”).
160 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005).
161 Unif. Parentage Act § 4(a)(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973) (emphasis added).
162 In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 936 (Cal. 2002).
163 See, e.g., In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 2002).
164 § 2.03(a) Definitions (“Individuals defined as parents under state law ordinarily include biological parents, whether
or not they are or ever have been married to each other, and adoptive parents. In some states, an individual may be a
parent also by virtue of an unrebutted legal presumption, such as the presumption that a husband is the father of his wife’s
child.”).
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Ultimately, parent by estoppel as a term gained little traction.165 Had the drafters called it
“holding out” parentage, perhaps the continuity between the Principles and subsequent developments
would be more clearly appreciated. Adoption of the nonbiological, gender-neutral “holding out”
presumption has accelerated in recent years. State courts have increasingly applied existing “holding
out” presumptions to reach nonbiological mothers and fathers in nonmarital families.166 Some states,
following the 2017 UPA, have expressly enacted a nonbiological, gender-neutral holding out
presumption.167
The Principles have mattered to the development of the law, even as they represent a particular
moment in time—one in which a functional family law project that extended equality to nonmarital
and LGBTQ parents could venture only so far. Massachusetts provides a useful illustration of how
the Principles advanced an equality-driven functional agenda and yet ultimately proved insufficient.
Early on, Massachusetts adopted the ALI’s approach to de facto parenthood, with some modification.
At the time, this constituted a landmark development for functional parenthood and LGBTQ equality.
Yet, this approach to de facto parenthood has been criticized for failing to provide parental rights and
responsibilities to an individual, including a nonbiological parent in a same-sex couple, who has
functioned as the child’s parent.168
What appeared progressive and child-protective at the time of the ALI eventually seemed
inadequate. In a landmark 2013 parentage decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cited
the inferior treatment of de facto parents, under both Massachusetts law and the ALI, as a basis for
finding that de facto parent adjudication was not a sufficient remedy for a nonbiological co-parent in
a same-sex couple. Instead, the court concluded, the nonbiological mother could establish parentage
under the state’s “holding out” presumption, which the court for the first time interpreted to authorize
nonbiological parentage.169 Without saying so, the court shifted from the weaker de facto parent
concept of the ALI to the more robust parent by estoppel concept—though the development
occurred under the rubric of presumed parentage.
One could read the court’s decision as rejecting the ALI’s approach: de facto parent status
failed to provide sufficient protection to functional parents. But one could also read it as vindicating
the ALI’s approach: a more comprehensive functional parent doctrine, operationalized through the
concept of “holding out,” was necessary. Either reading shows the complicated ways in which the
Principles have shaped the development of family law in inclusive and functional directions.170
CONCLUSION
The Principles intervened in important and evolving family law debates and pushed forward
agendas for reform with respect to both adult-adult and parent-child relationships. But the Principles’
impact has been uneven. Reflecting two decades later, we can see that the degree to which the ALI
influenced, or even predicted, the direction of the law has varied across these two domains.
The law’s treatment of parent-child relationships has moved in a decidedly functional
direction. Since the time of the ALI’s work, courts in many states have recognized nonmarital,
The concept retains purchase under New York law.
See Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012).
167 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-401 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26A.115 (2020); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
168 See Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child Behind, 48 FAM. L.Q. 495, 499–501 (2014).
169 See Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 n.17 (Mass. 2016).
170 As Bartlett observed in 2014, “the Principles captured trends that had already begun when the Principles were
drafted, and have continued since then.” Bartlett, supra note 3, at 34.
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nonbiological, nonadoptive parents under equitable and common law theories or based on statutory
presumptions.171 More recently, states have codified de facto parentage and a nonbiological “holding
out” presumption.172 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), promulgated by the Uniform Law
Commission (ULC), represents a comprehensive framework for implementing a functional approach
to parental recognition. As the drafters made clear, this functional approach not only reflects the
realities of family life but also vindicates important equality interests.173
In contrast, functional regulation of adult relationships has encountered more powerful
resistance. On the one hand, the move in some states toward alimony guidelines can be interpreted as
aligned with the Principles’ rejection of contract models in favor of status: equitable principles support
compensating for losses arising from the changes that marriage and its end bring.174 Similar to the ALI,
some state guidelines use a formula that increases both the amount and duration of alimony based on
the duration of a marriage.175 On the other hand, alimony reform is at least as likely to have been
driven by other powerful forces, including lobbying efforts by payors and growing hostility to
“permanent” alimony.176
Contract-based frameworks for unmarried cohabitants continue to dominate, and ascriptive
recognition has lagged.177 The ULC’s approach in UCERA is a striking example. The drafting
committee recognized that, nearly a half century after Marvin, there is “no predictable result when
cohabitants dissolve their relationship or one cohabitant dies,” that courts are reluctant to award
relief, and, particularly, may fail to recognize “domestic services” performed by one partner as a basis
for recovery.178 And yet, the UCERA Committee essentially codified Marvin; after initially including a
bracketed status-based provision on “presumptive equitable partnership”179 it declined to include a
status-based remedy, describing as “perhaps radical” the ALI’s approach of extending “marital
remedies” of alimony and equitable distribution of property to cohabitants.180 By contrast, the ALI
approach provided a model for scholars and advocates who urged the Committee to include a “statusbased option” in light of public policy concerns, including (echoing Blumberg) wealth-based power
See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 328-34; NeJaime, supra note 91, at 2370-72.
See supra notes 157, 167.
173 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (prefatory note).
174 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of A06728 (New York) (referring, in section on “Justification” for proposed
alimony bill, to the ALI Principles’ recognition of “economic losses that spouses suffer at the end of marriage” and its
suggestion to share those losses “through a formula for determining post-marital spousal support that takes into account
the income of the parties and the length of the marriage”). While the memo supporting the legislation that eventually
passed in 2015 does not repeat this reference to the Principles, the legislation includes various formula for determining the
amount and duration of spousal support. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236 (2022). The legislation, however, also includes an
income cap on how much of a payor’s income will be subject to the alimony guidelines.
175 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. CH. 208 (2022).
176 See, e.g., Kris Frieswick, ‘Til Death Do Us Pay, BOSTON MAG., Jun. 22, 2009; SB 1796 (Fla.) (enrolled legislation
awaiting governor’s signature that eliminates reference to “permanent” in alimony guidelines).
177 A few states have developed opt-in formal statuses for adult-adult relationships, such as Colorado’s Designated
Beneficiary Agreement. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22.106.1. More recently, municipalities have begun to enact domestic
partnership ordinances open to more than two partners. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE MUNICIPAL CODE, CHAP. 2.119020D
(enacted in March 2021).
178 See Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act 3-4 (draft for approval, July 9-15,
2021) (“Prefatory Note”). All cited materials about UCERA may be found at the ULC’s website:
https://www.uniformlaws.org/.
179 See Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Act 12-14 (Nov. 13, 2019 draft) (including in brackets Art. 4.
Presumptive Equitable Partnership) (noting Province of Alberta, Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (2002) as
influence).
180 See Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act 32 (draft for approval, July 9-15,
2021) (“Prefatory Note”).
171
172

24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4119927

DRAFT – Please do not cite without authors’ permission.
differentials between the parties and the problem with inferring “intent” given the varied reasons
cohabitants do not marry.181
The theoretical, normative, and practical arguments that animate the functional approach
apply in important ways to both the adult-adult and parent-child settings, and yet legal regulation has
diverged to a significant extent. Today, scholars point to the parent-child context to justify functional
reforms in the adult-adult setting, and those who resist a functional framework point to the regulation
of adult relationships as a model for parental recognition.182 Conflict over not only whether but how
regulation in these two contexts should converge carries forward a debate that was forged in significant
part by the Principles and the critiques it attracted, and today’s participants continue to look to the
Principles as a touchstone.183
While the values that the drafters of the Principles identified—equality, autonomy, fairness,
predictability, and certainty—remain critical to debates over a functional approach,184 today’s debate
is informed by nuanced empirical and ethnographic research. Indeed, scholars arguing about legal
regulation of families draw on research addressing some of the key empirical questions that Bartlett
identified as important but unanswered at the time the Principles emerged.185 An animating reason for
assimilating “domestic partners” to spouses was an empirical premise about the functional equivalence
in how people conducted and understood these relationships. Two decades later, debate continues
about the relationship between marriage and cohabitation (or, more broadly, “nonmarriage”). Some
research on why low- and moderate-income women separate marriage and parenthood and the high
“bar” to believing marriage with a current partner is desirable suggests conscious avoidance of
marriage’s economic sharing rules.186 Family law scholars differ in interpreting this work, with some
questioning whether the decision not to marry “is always or primarily fueled by a rejection of the
marital property rules,” rather than, for example, concern over relationship quality and the conviction
that marriage requires attaining a threshold level of economic stability and financial security that one
or both members of the couple currently lack.187 This perception that marriage is out of reach calls
into question the extent to which law and policy should continue to prioritize marriage. The literature
on different types of cohabiting relationships surfaces problems with imposing sharing rules on
cohabiting couples, yet also suggests the need for doctrinal innovations to address nonmarital
families.188 While race and class did not feature prominently in the Principles’ analysis of cohabitation,
more recent work highlights the role of racial and economic inequality in the decline of marriage
181 See Memo from Cathy Sakimura, National Center for Lesbian Rights & Professor Courtney Joslin, UC Davis, to
ULC Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Act Committee, Dec. 3, 2019; Proposed alternative text of Article 4
based on the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (draft of Article 4); see also Memo from Patricia A. Cain,
Professor of Law, Santa Clara University to ULC Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Act Committee, Dec. 4.
2019 (urging that “recognition based on status” is “the most important aspect of your project”).
182 Compare Joslin, supra note 86, (arguing that “capacious parentage rules that recognize, value, and respect chosen
family relationships . . . should [also] apply to the horizontal adult-adult relationships”), with Carbone & Cahn, supra note
86, at 108 (2016) (after examining tensions between the law of nonmarital parentage and the law of nonmarital coupling,
arguing for convergence in the direction of the approach of coupling).
183 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 86, at 984; Carbone & Cahn, supra note 86, at 66.
184 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 86, at 916-17, 977 (arguing for a functional approach to the regulation of nonmarital
families based on principles of “relational autonomy,” equality, and fairness).
185 See Bartlett, supra note 10, at 51-52.
186 See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN AND MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD
BEFORE MARRIAGE (2007); KATHRYN EDIN AND TIMOTHY NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE
INNER CITY (2013).
187 See Joslin, supra note 86, at 972-73 (2019). On these reasons, see, e.g., Kathryn Edin and Joanna M. Reed, Why
Don’t They Just Get Married? Barriers to Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 117 (Fall 2005).
188 Compare Carbone & Cahn, supra note 86, at 96, with Joslin, supra note 86, at 967.
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among some groups.189 This marriage gap and the emergence of marriage as a marker of privilege and
an engine of inequality complicate the assimilation of marriage and cohabitation,190 yet also bolster the
case for a regulatory system that reaches dependency relationships outside of marriage.191
In this sense, today’s debate differs importantly from the debate at the time of the Principles.
Proponents of the Principles’ functional approach sought to meet families where they were,
accommodating the realities of family life and tackling the inequalities at stake. While some critics
shared these goals, some opponents sought not to accommodate variation across families but instead
to channel family life into traditional structures and vindicate conventional roles.192 On this view, some
inequalities—between marital and nonmarital families, women and men, and different-sex and samesex couples—were not only justified but desirable. The drafters clearly repudiated this motivation to
impose rigid rules on families and channel family life into traditional structures.193 On this point, their
position now enjoys widespread support in the academy and in law reform work. Today, both
proponents and opponents of a functional approach aspire to legal rules that reflect the realities of
family life and address inequalities within and among families.194 For most participants in these
debates, the question is no longer whether but how to accommodate family diversity and address
inequalities within and among families. The values and goals that animated the Principles’ drafters are
now widely shared, even if they lead scholars and policymakers to different conclusions.

See Bloome & Ang, supra note 16.
See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, How Did Marriage Become a Mark of Privilege?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017); Pew, The Decline
of Marriage and Rise of New Families, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/; JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE
MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
191 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 86, at 946.
192 See Graglia, supra note 76, at 993; Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s
“Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1232.
193 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 846 (1998) (“the principles
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194 Compare Carbone & Cahn, supra note 86, at 120-21, with Joslin, supra note 86, at 986-87.
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